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THE MILITARY STRATEGIES OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Jack R. Cantrell

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

4 June 1974

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USAMC MILITARY RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER

THE MILITARY STRATEGIES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
4 June 1974

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16

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PREFACE

This Individual Research Project is a historical case study planned to focus on the origin, evolution, and effects of the military strategies of the United States and the Confederate States in the American Civil War. The scope and methodology were determined by the author. This research paper is designed to stand alone or to be used in concert with additional studies to examine other aspects of the same war or to provide comparisons with studies of military strategies in other wars. Although the effort did not uncover material not previously published, the content and organization of the material presented have not been assembled in comparable form in a document of comparable length. The study was conducted under time constraints that limited exhaustive research of primary sources; however, it is considered that dependable secondary sources were used in a sufficient number to validate the study's reliability. The appreciation of the author is extended for the advice and assistance of the Director, Military Strategy Seminar and Director, Allied Strategy Studies, Department of Military Planning and Strategy, US Army War College and the Visiting Professor, US Army Chair of Military History Research, US Army Military History Research Collection (USA, MHRC) and the support of the staff of the USA, MHRC which made the completion of this study possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
PREFACE	iii
CHAPTER I. PRELUDE TO WAR	1
II. PREPARATION FOR WAR	13
III. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS	32
IV. CONDUCT OF THE WAR	41
The National Military Strategies	41
Onward to Richmond, 1861	55
Antietam and Emancipation, 1862	61
The Highwater Mark, 1863	73
War is Hell, 1864-65	80
In Retrospect	88
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	98

THE MILITARY STRATEGIES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER I

PRELUDE TO WAR

"Military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force."¹ "War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means."² This is a study of the military strategies of the American Civil War. To trace their creation and maturation the study will begin with the birth of the opposing objectives of national policy which the resulting military strategies sought to accomplish.

The real and perceived grievances of Southern states which alleged attempts at deprivation of their equality in the Union and discrimination in legislation against the interests of their people climaxed following the election of Abraham Lincoln in November, 1860. The specific issues included: the continued existence and extension of slavery, economic sectionalism, and states rights versus nationalism.³ Apprehensive of an Administration which was anticipated as unfavorable to their

aspirations, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas seceded from the Union between December 20, 1860, and February 1, 1861, and seized most of the Federal post offices, customs houses, mints, arsenals, and forts within their boundaries. At Montgomery, Alabama, during February, the seceding states formed the Confederate States of America and chose Jefferson Davis as the president of their provisional government. At his inauguration Davis announced:

The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United States, and which has been solemnly reaffirmed in the Bills of Rights...undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the sovereign States here represented have proceeded to form this Confederacy...

Anticipating problems he warned:

For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs that there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on a peace establishment.⁴

The announced objective of the new nation was independence from the Union, and preparations were made to fight for their objective.

On March 4, 1861, Lincoln, at his inauguration as President of the United States, swore to faithfully execute the office of President and "...to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."⁵ In his inaugural speech he stated the case for the Union:

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States.

Specifically he promised to use all the power at his disposal to "...hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government..." and expressed his intention of accomplishing this objective peacefully if possible: "In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority."⁶

When Lincoln came to office, the Confederate States were demanding the surrender of the forts within their boundaries which were still occupied by Union forces. Fort Sumter, near the mouth of Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, was one of these posts which had become the focus of mounting political and military tension.⁷ Its garrison would require resupply by April 15 in order to hold the fort. Lincoln was aware of the likelihood of a confrontation of arms if he attempted to resupply Fort Sumter. A similar expedition sponsored by President Buchanan, using the steamer Star of the West, resulted in that ship's being turned back by Confederate cannon on January 9.⁸ Seeking to preserve the Union peacefully, Lincoln considered and rejected three alternatives while continuing to prepare for the contingent resupply of the

fort. Fort Sumter could have been evacuated in exchange for Virginia's pledge to remain in the Union. Four meetings with Virginia Unionists convinced Lincoln of the futility of this option.⁹ Second, the fort could have been evacuated and customs collected off-shore by Union ships. This solution appeared to be potentially as irritating to the seceded states as maintenance of Federal forts by the Union. Final cabinet-member recommendations and a presidential decision on this option were probably overtaken by the time constraints of the Fort Sumter crisis and the subsequent blockade.¹⁰ Third, the fort could have been evacuated to buy time for further efforts at conciliation; while Fort Pickens, still held, off the Florida coast, could have been reinforced to show Lincoln's resolve to enforce the law. Contemporary evidence prior to the firing upon Fort Sumter does not indicate that Lincoln intended a separate policy for the two posts.¹¹ Refusing to talk with Confederate Commissioners who had been sent to Washington to negotiate friendly relations and settlement of questions of disagreement between the governments of the Confederacy and the United States,¹² Lincoln notified Governor Francis W. Pickens of South Carolina that the Union would attempt to resupply Fort Sumter with provisions only, but if that attempt were opposed, the fort would be reinforced, also, with men, arms and ammunition.¹³

In effect, the initiative had been Lincoln's since his inauguration. Implementation of policy does not always involve action. The Confederate-perceived inactivity of Lincoln had menaced "the fragile nature of Southern unity....Time became a subtle Southern enemy. An unfanned crisis loses impact rapidly."¹⁴ Now, Lincoln retained the initiative through action—the action of merely keeping his inaugural promises. If the Confederates moved to prevent the resupply, then they would be the aggressor in a conflict that many of them did not want and, if it came, a conflict in which they wanted to appear to the world as the oppressed. Yet, if the Confederates did not prevent the resupply, they would demonstrate to the same audience a lack of sovereignty, an acceptance of defeat. On April 10 Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs in Montgomery warned:

The firing upon that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen....Mr. President, at this time, it is suicide, murder, and will lose us every friend at the North. You will wantonly strike a hornets nest which extends from mountains to ocean, and legions, now quiet, will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary; it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal.¹⁵

On the same day President Davis received a telegram from his old friend Texas Senator Louis Wigfall, who was in Charleston:

No one doubts that Lincoln intends war. The delay on his part is only to complete his preparations. Our delay therefore is to his advantage and our disadvantage. Let us take Fort Sumter before we

have to fight the fleet and the fort....Virginia is excited by the preparations, and a bold stroke on our side will complete her purposes. Policy and prudence are urgent upon us to begin at once.¹⁶

Before the Union resupply was attempted, at 4:30 a.m. on April 12, the burst of a Confederate mortar round over Fort Sumter signaled the barrage that reduced that post and triggered the American Civil War.

Fort Sumter fell on April 14, and on the following day President Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 militia in order to suppress:

...combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the Marshals by law...to suppress said combinations and to cause the laws to be duly executed...to re-possess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union....

He requested the support of loyal citizens to maintain the honor, integrity, and existence of the Union and the perpetuity of popular government; "...and to redress wrongs already long enough endured." Persons composing the "combinations" were commanded to disperse and Congress was summoned to convene on July 4, 1861.¹⁷ The national objectives and policy concerning the crisis of the Union, intimated by Lincoln in his inaugural address, were now clarified with expansion and with provisions made for their accomplishment. The Union would be preserved, and that part of it which had been taken away would be retrieved by the application of force.

Dramatic actions, key to shaping the impending

struggle, followed in rapid succession. On April 17, Jefferson Davis partially answered Lincoln's call for troops with a proclamation inviting applications for commissions or letters of marque and reprisal for privateering on the high seas, to be issued under the seal of the Confederate States.¹⁸ Lincoln countered on the nineteenth with a proclamation of the Union blockade of the ports of the states which had seceded to that time. (The blockade was extended on April 27 to Virginia and North Carolina.¹⁹) Lincoln had carefully avoided considering the secession and its associated acts more than an insurrection, a rebellion, and would continue to do so. But on April 25, by act of its Congress, the Confederacy recognized the existence of war between the Confederate States and the United States and territories thereof, except for the uncommitted slaveholding states, the territories of Arizona and New Mexico and the Indian territory south of Kansas.²⁰

The national objectives of the Union and the Confederacy in April, 1861, were incompatible with peace. The conditions under which the seceded states would have returned to the Union would have perpetuated slavery and would have accommodated minority aspirations to the extent of rendering the democratic system ineffective. There were grounds for compromise and the possibility that enough principals on both sides, regardless of their

stand on slavery, economics, minority and states rights, abhored war enough that such a compromise could have been negotiated. But the time constraints imposed on the necessities of Fort Sumter, realistically or otherwise, by both sides prohibited further negotiations.

Lincoln's actions were in fulfillment of his duties as President. If the Confederate States were within their rights in seceding, the manner in which they confiscated "their share" of the national property should have caused them to expect a fight, and their preparations indicated such an expectation. Davis' decision to play his hand at Fort Sumter was the result of a strategic estimate that further delay would work less in the favor of the Confederacy than of the Union. It is likely, also, that Davis did not perceive the firing upon Fort Sumter as a point-of-no-return.

It can be argued that Lincoln, knowing the untenable military situation of the Fort Sumter garrison, could have withdrawn it, continued to reinforce posts that he could hold and which were less publicly abrasive than Fort Sumter, and, thereby, borrowed time for negotiations. In resupplying the fort, Lincoln opted for consistency of stated policy backed by a threat of military force. In calling for troops to restore government property to the Union and to enforce the law, he forfeited the further possibilities of a peaceful solution.

In firing upon Fort Sumter before the resupply was attempted, Davis accepted the military opportunity offered to engage a smaller force than the fleet and the fort. He was influenced in varying degrees by the insistence of the secessionist "firebrands"; the calculated effect that the action would have on the uncommitted states; the desire for a display of sovereignty to convince the Union and Europe that the Confederacy was a viable nation; and the possibility that if he did not give the order, the governor of South Carolina would.

One could hardly expect peace to result from the strategy of either president, although it is likely that neither man conjectured the extent of the war that would come. Progress toward the achievement of the national objectives of both was made, with Lincoln receiving the better grade in this respect. Lincoln had maintained the initiative and, whether or not it was his intent, gave Davis little opportunity but to fire the first shot. The first shot had a positive effect of varying and undetermined proportions on the undecided slaveholding states. But its effect in the North was an electrifyingly cohesive attraction to the Union. Lincoln's call for troops to deal with the insurrection stung the slaveholding states, spurring them to secession or to provide recruits for the Confederacy (with few exceptions, ie. Delaware). The call was answered

enthusiastically and with a demonstrated sense of urgency by the Northern States. The plateau of conflict to which armed diplomacy had brought the belligerents was characterized by: a stronger cohesiveness within each camp; the need of the Union and Confederacy to win the undecided border states and foreign sympathy; and the requirement to build war machines with which to address the conflict ahead.

CHAPTER I

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14. Vandiver, p. 36.

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CHAPTER II

PREPARATION FOR WAR

The three months between the firing upon Fort Sumter and the first major battle were filled with events involving the decisions of the border states, securing and evacuating posts, and raising and equipping the armies and navies.

In calling for troops to suppress the "insurrection," Lincoln risked the loss of some of the undecided states. He probably overestimated the feeling of Unionism that existed in these states and in the Confederacy. Loss of any of the undecided states would be costly. Loss of Kentucky and Missouri could be decisive in the outcome of the war.

Despite the pro-Union sentiment in its western counties, Virginia seceded on April 17. Arkansas and Tennessee seceded on May 6 and 7, respectively, followed by North Carolina on May 20. (These dates generally reflect the dates that secession ordinances were passed except in the case of Tennessee, where the date corresponds to its military league with the Confederate States. The dates cited here are earlier than referendums in states where they were held but are generally considered

the effective dates of secession.¹⁾ The overriding reasons for the secession of these states vary but basically reside in reaction to Lincoln's attempt to resupply Fort Sumter, his call for troops, and the social and economic ties that these states had with those which had already seceded.

Because Washington lay on the border of Virginia and in the midst of an undecided slave state, Lincoln and his advisors looked to the matter of local defense of the Federal capital. Five companies of Pennsylvania militia (to be armed on arrival) and a company of regulars from Minnesota reached Washington on April 18. On the 19th, the 6th Massachusetts Regiment in route to Washington clashed with rioting secessionist sympathizers in Baltimore. After the 6th Massachusetts passed, Maryland secessionists cut the rail line between Baltimore and Washington. Consequently, New York troops and Massachusetts units for the defense of the Union capital were rerouted from Philadelphia to Annapolis by water, then by rail to Washington. The Union established the Department of Annapolis under the command of Brigadier General Benjamin F. Butler. This command included twenty miles on each side of the railroad from Annapolis to Washington. That part of Maryland which was not included in these limits was a part of the Department of Pennsylvania. On April 27 Lincoln authorized the suspension of the writ of Habeas

Corpus along a line from Philadelphia to Washington.²

On the 29th, the Maryland legislature meeting in Fredrick voted against secession.³ The Union could not afford the loss of Maryland and the Lincoln administration saw to its remaining with military support. James G. Randall and David Donald write:

To support the unconditional Unionist candidate for governor, Augustus W. Bradford, Generals Nathaniel P. Banks and John A. Dix, under orders from the secretary of war, kept the Maryland legislature under close military surveillance and placed nineteen of its members, along with Mayor George W. Brown of Baltimore and other citizens, under arbitrary arrest. Maryland troops received three-day furloughs in order to go home and vote...General Dix ordered the provost marshals to arrest any dis-Unionists or Southern sympathizers who turned up at the polls.⁴

Bradford was elected and Maryland became a loyal state.

Although there was vocal Southern sympathy within Delaware, the state legislature voted against joining the Confederacy on January 3, 1861. On April 26, Governor William Burton recommended the formation of volunteer companies for protection of the people of the state with the option of defending Washington and support of the Constitution and laws of the country. Delaware provided 12,000 enlistments for the Union.⁵

Exercising caution to save the Union sentiment resident in Missouri, Kentucky and the western counties of Virginia, the Union moved to secure its heartland. On April 23, Cairo, Illinois, at the confluence of the

Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, was occupied by Illinois militia which began to stop boats and seize southbound arms and munitions. With Lincoln's partial approval and the commendable initiative of Captain James H. Stokes, representing the Governor of Illinois, and Captain Nathaniel Lyon, the commander of the St. Louis Arsenal, most of the arms of that installation were saved from the potential threat of Missouri secessionists by a midnight requisition on April 25-26. Troops were also stationed at Evansville, Indiana and near Cincinnati, Ohio. On May 3, the Department of the Ohio, consisting of the states of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, was organized and presently placed under the command of Major General George B. McClellan.⁶ On May 16, Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles initiated actions to provide that department with naval armament to operate on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.⁷

Secessionist sympathies within Kentucky were spread geographically throughout the state. Kentucky was connected to the Southern states by slavery and river commerce but was also strongly influenced by Union politics in the tradition of Henry Clay. Congressman John J. Crittenden counseled Kentucky to stand by the Union, at the same time advising against the policy of coercion of the seceding states. Governor Beriah Magoffin refused Lincoln's April 15 call for troops. He

also refused to send troops to Harpers Ferry at the request of the Confederate Secretary of War. Unable to move the state to secession, he declared it neutral on May 20 and worked covertly with future Confederate General Simon B. Buckner to promote secession. Lincoln countered with weapons support to Union agents in the state and sent the Fort Sumter hero, Kentuckian Robert Anderson, to his home state and to Unionist Western Virginia to recruit army regiments. Nine out of ten Kentucky Congressmen elected in June, 1861, were Unionist. After election of the state legislature in August, Unionist members held a three-fourths majority and Unionist military units, which had been organized covertly, assembled openly at Camp Dick Robinson in Garrard County, Kentucky. On August 19, 1861, Governor Magoffin requested Lincoln to remove that military force. Lincoln's refusal and continued pressure by Kentucky Unionists, coupled with subsequent Confederate and Union military operations in the state, caused secessionist leaders to depart Kentucky and join Confederate forces in Tennessee. On August 24, Magoffin requested the assurance of Davis that the Confederacy would respect the neutrality of Kentucky. Davis hedged in his answer on the 28th:

... neutrality, to be entitled to respect, must be strictly maintained between both parties; or, if the door be opened on the one side for the aggressions of one of the belligerent parties upon the other, it ought not to be shut to the assailed when they seek to enter it for purposes of self defense.⁸

Confederate forces under Major General Leonidas Polk, in response to Union occupation of Belmont, Missouri across the Mississippi River from Columbus, Kentucky, occupied Hickman, Kentucky on September 3, and Columbus on the 4th. Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant countered with Union occupation of the Kentucky shore opposite Cairo, Illinois and Paducah, Kentucky. General Albert Sidney Johnston succeeded Polk in command of Confederate forces and ordered further incursion into Kentucky.⁹ Regardless of the Unionist recruiting activities at Camp Dick Robinson, the stigma of breaching Kentucky's nominal neutrality resided with the Confederacy. Kentucky provided recruits for the Union and the Confederacy, maintained a shadow Confederate government seldom quartered in the state, and sent representatives to the Confederate Congress.¹⁰ But Kentucky was largely lost by the Confederacy which needed not just part of its military-age men but all of its resources and its geographical location, almost in the heart of the Union. The Confederacy's loss was the Union's gain.

In March, 1861, Governor Claiborne F. Jackson of Missouri persuaded the legislature of that state to convene, hoping that he could influence a movement for secession. To his dismay, the convention was overwhelmingly Unionist and adjourned on March 22 without passing an ordinance to secede. Jackson's secessionist

element within the state was opposed by a Unionist element led by Congressman Francis Blair, Jr., and Captain Nathaniel Lyon. Blair was the brother of Lincoln's Postmaster General, and the President maintained close communications with Blair concerning the secession crisis in Missouri. The secessionist garrison of Camp Jackson near St. Louis was captured and disarmed by Unionists led by Lyon on May 10, 1861. Street fighting followed in St. Louis. Governor Jackson formed a state military force and placed it under the command of former Governor Sterling Price, a veteran of the Mexican War. Price had been a Unionist but had become disillusioned and outraged at the conduct of Lyon and the Union extremists, principally for the unprovoked attack on Camp Jackson. War continued between these factions, resulting in the battles of Wilson's Creek (August 10, 1861), in which the Union forces were defeated and Lyon (then a general) was killed, and Pea Ridge (March 6-8, 1862), a decisive victory for the Union that brought most of the state under control of the Union. Thereafter, a guerrilla war raged in Missouri and Kansas which grew out of pre-Civil War "Jayhawker"-border ruffian conflicts featuring James H. Lane and Charles R. Jennison versus William C. Quantrill. The Union retained Missouri by superior military power. Although the state maintained a shadow Confederate government and was represented in the Confederate Congress in

a manner similar to Kentucky, the bulk of the large population of Missouri was lost by the Confederacy. Missouri provided 109,000 men for the Union army, about 30,000 to the Confederacy.¹¹

The formation of West Virginia resulted from a series of acts that had little basis in, or even appearance of, the democratic process as exemplified by the United States Constitution. Prior to the Civil War, the people of the mountainous western counties of Virginia had grievances against the tidewater, middle Virginia, Piedmont and valley sections of the state, founded on alleged discrimination in favor of slaveholders in matters of taxation, limitations on voting, and partiality in the distribution of government benefits. There was more of a feeling of commonality in part of this area with Ohio than with Virginia. It is doubtful that the grievances would have caused an intra-state secession problem if the war had not offered the opportunity for separation of the western counties from the mother state. After the secession of Virginia from the Union in April, 1861, a series of Unionist mass meetings was held setting up a Unionist shadow government within Virginia. In June of that year Major General George B. McClellan entered the western part of Virginia with a force of 20,000 Union troops. After two Union victories (in which McClellan barely participated), the area came under Union control. By

devious means, without wide popular support in the remainder of Virginia or even within many of the fifty counties included in its charter, a new state was formed with loyalty to the Union. Reluctantly, in view of the circumstances of its formation, Lincoln proclaimed the state of West Virginia a part of the Union, effective June 20, 1863. A part of the evolution in the formation of this state had been the organization of the pro-Union shadow government in Virginia of which Lincoln advocated recognition by the United States Congress in July, 1861. Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates, suggested that the President helped devise the shadow government scheme.¹²

The realistic attitude toward border state neutrality which Lincoln expressed in his address to the U.S. Congress July 4, 1861, was clear and indicative of Union actions which had been taken and which would follow:

... For the neutral border states to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or the disunion the other, over their soil, would be disunion completed.... At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade.¹³

In terms of military strategy, the border states represented assets to be retained or, at least, denied to the adversary. The competition to win the border states, on the part of the Union, was for partial accomplishment of her national objectives to preserve the Union and to retain as many resources as possible with which to attain that end.

The Confederates would have been glad to have added the border states to the Confederacy for ideological reasons, but the urgent need for them was a matter of critical geography and strategic military resources. Lincoln's success over Davis in the campaign for the border states can be attributed largely to the strong Union sentiment residual in the states concerned, Union troops and weapons support made readily accessible or brought quickly to bear, and the existence of government organization through which Lincoln could act to accomplish his purposes.

In addition to the troop movements made to bolster the defense of Washington and to secure wavering states and loyal areas during the infancy of the war, other moves of lasting strategic importance were made. Fort Monroe, Virginia was reinforced by a Massachusetts regiment on April 20. Credit for this sagacious move is attributed to Lieutenant General Winfield Scott. Some historians have considered the retention of this post by the Union as a determinant of the war. Certainly it is significant that most of the expeditions to attack the coast of the Confederacy would be assembled here. Continued Union control of this fort significantly influenced the later land operations in Northern Virginia, particularly the Peninsula Campaign.¹⁴ However, on the same day the Union evacuated the Gosport Navy Yard near Norfolk, Virginia, a move that Union authorities would regret.

It made available to the Confederacy a port, the dry dock, the industrial plant, some vessels (the USS Merrimack was later refloated as the CSS Virginia), and one thousand guns. On the following day, Harpers Ferry Arsenal was offered up to the Virginians. Arkansas militia seized Fort Smith, and further west the Indian Territory was abandoned by the Union, leaving the five civilized Indian tribes to the influence of the Confederacy. Ships of both belligerents, caught in port, changed hands.

Among the favorite sons who cast their lots of loyalty during these troubled days were several with strategic impact. Robert E. Lee declined command of the Union Army on April 18 and on the 22nd was confirmed as the commander of the forces of Virginia. David G. Farragut left his home in Norfolk, Virginia, on April 19 for continued service with the United States Navy. On April 25 Albert Sidney Johnston was relieved of command of the U.S. Army Department of the Pacific and departed cross-country for the Confederacy.¹⁵

On April 29 Jefferson Davis announced to the Confederate Congress his intention of organizing a 100,000-man army. On May 3, Lincoln called for 42,034 volunteers to serve for three years unless sooner discharged, and for an increase in the size of the Regular Army and the Navy. Total army strength would be 156,861, Navy strength, 25,000.¹⁶ Lincoln authorized the establishment of an

arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois. The Confederates dismantled their inherited arsenal at Harper Ferry, divided its assets between Richmond, Virginia and Fayetteville, North Carolina, and sent an agent abroad to purchase arms—on credit.

The primary feature of similarity in a comparison of the preparedness of the Union and Confederacy for war was their nearly total lack of it. Regardless of the postwar claims of Generals Joseph E. Johnston¹⁷ and P.G.T. Beauregard¹⁸ that the Confederacy had enough resources to win the war, the preponderance of advantage in assets was heavily in favor of the Union. When the choosing of sides was completed, the Union was composed of twenty-two states. The Confederacy had eleven. Omitting Missouri and Kentucky, which were divided between the belligerents, the Union with a population of 20,700,000 confronted the Confederacy with 9,105,000. Of the latter 3,654,000 were Negroes, mostly slaves. The slaves were important to the economy of the Confederacy and in making more free men available for armed service, but recruitment of Negro troops by the Confederate Army was not authorized until the closing weeks of the war.¹⁹ The Union's economic strength was also superior to that of the Confederacy. In 1860 (in round figures) the Union had 110,000 manufacturing establishments employing 1,300,000 workers. In the same year, the states that were to form the

Confederacy had 18,000 manufacturing establishments with 110,000 workers. The annual value of manufactures in New York alone was four times that of the whole Confederacy. In 1860 those states which would form the Confederacy produced only 4 per cent of the locomotives built in the United States and 3 per cent of the firearms. In 1861 the Confederate States contained less than 30 per cent of the total railroad mileage of what had been the United States.²⁰ By April, 1862, when the Confederacy would resort to conscription and President Davis' "dispersed defensive" strategy would be criticized by the Confederate Congress for making the draft necessary, Davis would reply:

Without military stores, without the workshops to create them, without the power to import them, necessity, not choice has compelled us to occupy strong positions and everywhere to confront the enemy without reserves.²¹

Whereas, in contrast, in December, 1864, Lincoln would tell the United States Congress:

The important fact remains demonstrated, that we have more men now than we had when the war began; that we are not exhausted, nor in process of exhaustion; that we are gaining strength, and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely. This as to men. Material resources are now more complete and abundant than ever. The national resources are unexhausted, and we believe, inexhaustible.²²

If success in war is dependent upon material wealth, there should have been little question that the Union would eventually prevail. Instead one might ask how would the Confederacy defer defeat so long—or why

would it even risk a war in which it was at such a material disadvantage?²³ Perhaps the answer lies with the Confederacy's estimation of the alleged psychological advantage of fighting for independence; of fighting a defensive war, on its own ground, with comparatively short interior lines; of the economic and diplomatic potential of "King Cotton";²⁴ of the expectations of favorable foreign intervention; and of the fighting ability of Confederate forces. Similarly, the Confederacy underestimated the determination within the Union. There would be no irrefutable answers as to why the ultimate victor would win, but a glance at the disparities in the material assets of the Union and the Confederacy discloses the surety of their influence on the respective military strategies and the final outcome.

By mid-summer, 1861, the sides had been drawn. Four states of the upper South had refused to provide troops to suppress their seceded, institutional sisters and, instead, had joined them in their quest for independence. Virginia, the first of these to decide, lent prestige, population, industry, and leadership to the cause. Arkansas followed resignedly, authorizing her government to call out 60,000 men (a questionable capability considering a white population of less than 325,000) and a \$2,000,000 bond issue. A coup d' état by Tennessee's Governor, Isham G. Harris, and the

Legislature committed that state to the Confederacy with an authorization of an immediate force of 25,000, a reserve of 30,000, and a bond issue of \$5,000,000. Within the Confederate States Tennessee was second only to Virginia in population and industry and would have been the granary and pork barrel of the Confederacy if it had not fallen to early Union occupation. North Carolina was the last state committed. (Tennessee's later referendum was merely a ratification of an accomplished fact.) The reluctance of North Carolina to secede before Lincoln's call for troops and Virginia's secession was reversed by Governor John W. Ellis and a secession convention. Ellis denounced Lincoln's call, seized the arsenal at Fayetteville, the mint at Charlotte, three forts on the coast, and requested 30,000 recruits. As was implied by their late entry into the Confederacy, these states were by no means internally unanimous in agreement with Confederate policies, and there was strong feeling within each that they were being dragged into a needless war by the "fire-brands". This was especially true, with strategic impact, in the almost slaveless mountainous sections of three of the states. West Virginia was separating. The pro-Union referendum results in East Tennessee inspired Lincoln to give a hapless priority to Union military operations into that area. Troops from western North Carolina would balk at Lee's "invasion" of Maryland. The area of Arkansas

adjacent to Kansas was a Union stronghold. Regardless, the Confederacy could not have long endured without the geography and resources of these states, and they bore their share of its burdens.

The contest for the remaining slaveholding states was largely lost by the Confederacy to Lincoln and the Union through geography, statecraft, local politics, and military force. Delaware's location gave no hope for her seceding. The Union could not afford to let Washington be cut off by the secession of Maryland, and Lincoln moved realistically, if harshly, to secure it with application of military force. The road for West Virginia's separation and allegiance to the Union was cleared by McClellan's campaign, and the vital Baltimore and Ohio Railroad connecting Washington with the Union West was secured. The Ohio River Line was defended and the blockade effected at Cairo with meticulous care not to offend "neutral" Kentucky, and, while that state wavered, Lincoln took a personal hand in organizing and arming its Union sentiment. Its geographic location, almost at the heart of the Union and along the Ohio River, made Kentucky a strategic necessity to the belligerents. Lincoln may have backed the least prudent Union faction in Missouri. Blair and Lyon were intensely loyal but rash. A more patient course might have saved more of that state for the Union and lessened its bloody internal

conflict during the larger war, but the bulk of its resources (population, 1,200,000 and the St. Louis industrial complex) were denied to the Confederacy.²⁵

In this phase of the war, Lincoln again deserves high marks, but Davis could hardly be censured. He was limited by the uncertainties involved in the upper South and by the lack of military assets to apply where they might have countered those of the Union. He had little choice but to rely upon local secessionists to influence the situation and, in some cases, they were not adequate for the task. The moves of the national executives in organizing and equipping their forces are those that would have been expected. (Mismanagement of Confederate cotton assets, failure of the Confederacy to formulate a realistic tax program, and foreign diplomatic moves taken at this time, although of crucial impact on the conduct and outcome of the war, are beyond the scope of this study of military strategy.) One might argue that if the war was not lost by the Confederacy when Lincoln called for troops, it was lost now, without a major military battle. Military force had been applied and too much of the Union may well have been saved, already, for the Confederacy to have a chance to win.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER III

THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

Technically, the opposing national objectives dictated the general pattern of the Union and Confederate military strategies. The Union would have to attack to reclaim the seceded states. The Confederacy would have to defend itself against those attacks. This truism and the limited resources of the Confederate States, which curtailed their extensive offensive operations, would result in most of the war's being fought on Southern soil. The principal topographic features in the area of operations included:

a. A coastline of more than 3,500 miles bounded the Confederacy from the Chesapeake Bay to the Rio Grande. To the Confederacy this coast represented a line of supply to Europe and the West Indies, but also a vast area to defend against landing operations. To the Union it represented ports that would have to be blockaded or seized. Ten ports were significant. They had deep draft harbors and adequate rail connections with the interior. Consequently, they were the facilities through which most of the Confederacy's imports and exports passed. They were Newbern, Beaufort and Wilmington, North Carolina;

Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah and Brunswick, Georgia; Fernandina and Pensacola, Florida; Mobile, Alabama; and New Orleans, Louisiana.¹

b. The Appalachian Mountains formed a barrier oriented generally northeast-southwest from northern Virginia to northern Alabama, dividing the area east of the Mississippi River into two theaters of operations. In Virginia, with consideration given to the gaps or passes, the mountains provided limited flank protection to the opposing armies. In West Virginia and East Tennessee, the mountains dictated special operations which applied to organization of terrain, consideration of severe weather conditions, restrictions of visibility, and limitations on mobility.

c. The rivers on the eastern slopes of the mountains run generally in a southeasterly direction, cutting the terrain into cross compartments and favoring the defense as obstacles, except where offensive forces controlled both banks sufficiently to use the navigable rivers as routes of attack, troop transport, and resupply. West of the Appalachians the Ohio, Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi Rivers were the primary commercial transportation system in the South. They were also the primary avenue of approach into the Confederate States, and their control would decide the fate of the Western Confederacy.

d. This was the first major war in which rail transportation was used. Most of the large armies of the Union and the Confederacy were continually dependent upon rail transportation in some part of their supply system. (Exceptions included Grant's operations at Vicksburg and Sherman's march to the sea. Both were temporary operations with planned resupply by water.) Comparatively, the railroad system of the North had been highly developed before the war to answer dense population and industry needs. In the South, shipment of cotton, the primary commodity, was cheaper by water, and the railroads were feeders to the water transportation system. There were two principal railroads from the deep South to Virginia. The western line was from Memphis through Chattanooga, Knoxville and Lynchburg; the other was from Mobile through Atlanta, Augusta and Columbia, with alternate routes through Savannah and Wilmington. There was no standard railroad gauge. Railroads in the South were built separately without consideration to developing a continuous system, resulting in separate terminals and the need for time and labor-consuming transloading. (Local towns-people opposed junction of the railroads because of the fares earned from transferring passengers and freight between terminals.) The rails, cars, and locomotives for Southern railroads were manufactured almost totally in the North.² (Virginia was the only Southern state that

manufactured locomotives in 1860.³) In the latter part of the war, when they were damaged, destroyed, or captured, rails and other equipment could be replaced only by scavenging from lower priority areas.

The following strategic topographic considerations applied to individual states or groups of states within the Confederacy:⁴

a. Virginia was the most populous and industrialized state in the Confederacy. Richmond, the state capital, became the capital of the Confederate States on May 21, 1861. It was an industrial and transportation center and the location of the nationally prominent Tredegar Iron Works, vitally essential to armament production for the Confederacy. Norfolk was the state's major port, but its shipping capability was nullified by the Union's possession of Fort Monroe. Except for the navigability of the York and James Rivers, the Tidewater section was unfavorable to offensive operations. Rivers in the Piedmont were fordable at selected sites but also favored the defense. The Blue Ridge Mountains separate the Piedmont from the Valley section. The Shenandoah Valley was agriculturally highly productive and was strategically located as an avenue of approach toward Washington. The state was provided well with roads which sustained military traffic, except when winter and spring rains turned them to mud. In comparison

to her sister states, railroad coverage in Virginia was ample except for the Valley. The avenues of approach toward Richmond were: the Alexandria-Gordonsville-Richmond railroad; the Aquia Creek-Fredricksburg-Richmond railroad; the York River and the West Point-Richmond Railroad; and the James River and the City Point-Petersburg railroad. Secondary avenues were from Clarksburg and Gauley Bridge, West Virginia into the Shenandoah Valley. The primary avenue of approach from Virginia to the north was via the Shenandoah Valley into the Cumberland Valley of Pennsylvania.

b. Tennessee was the second most populous and industrialized state in the Confederacy. The state is divided into three sections from east to west by the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River. East Tennessee was connected to Virginia, but not West Virginia or Kentucky, by railroad. The Cumberland Gap on the Kentucky and Tennessee state line was a vital avenue of approach into the upper Tennessee Valley, as was the pass north of Knoxville, the section's principal city. Nashville, the state capital and an industrial center capable of producing bar, sheet, and railroad iron, was located in the central section at the head of navigation on the Cumberland River. It was also served by the Louisiana and Nashville Railroad. Chattanooga, on the southeastern border of the central section, was a railroad

center for lines to Nashville; Memphis; Lynchburg, Virginia; and Atlanta, Georgia. The western section of the state was bounded on the east by the Tennessee River and on the west by the Mississippi River. It was traversed by the Louisville-Bowling Green-Memphis railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad (from Columbus, Ohio to Corinth, Mississippi). A branch railroad ran from Jackson, Tennessee through Mississippi to New Orleans. The major avenues of approach into Tennessee were from Covington, Kentucky through Lexington to Knoxville; the Louisville and Nashville Railroad; the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; and the Cumberland, Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers.

c. The rank of tenth in population limited the importance of Arkansas, the northernmost member of the Confederacy west of the Mississippi River. Scarcity of railroads limited operations within this state. The principal avenue of approach, once the Mississippi was opened by the Union to the Arkansas River, was by the Arkansas river to the interior of the state. Others included the roads from Ironton and Cape Girardeau to Pocahontas, Arkansas in the east and from Springfield or Neosho to Van Buren, Arkansas in the west.

d. Fourth in population and possessing resources vital to the life of the Confederacy, such as the port of Wilmington, North Carolina was vulnerable to blockade, coastal landings, and subsequent operations against the

Wilmington-Charleston-Savannah railroad. South Carolina had similar susceptibilities, complicated by the islands between Charleston and the Savannah River, which could be used to base operations against Charleston or the forts at the mouth of the Savannah River.

e. Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, which were third, fifth, and sixth, respectively, in Confederate state population, were protected from the north as long as Tennessee, particularly Chattanooga and Memphis, held. Atlanta was a valuable manufacturing and transportation center. Savannah was Georgia's most important port. In Alabama, Mobile was a vital port and Selma housed limited manufacturing capabilities. Two railroads traversed Alabama from east to west, but there were none running north into Tennessee, a factor that might give a potential invader pause. Mississippi was strategically located along the river of the same name. It contained Vicksburg, which was a rail center that would command the river after Memphis and New Orleans fell. The Vicksburg-Meridian, Mississippi railroad was the connecting link between the trans-Mississippi states and the East during the same era. Mississippi was penetrated from the north by the Mississippi Central and Mobile and Ohio Railroads.

f. The Mississippi River and the Port of New Orleans compensated in importance for Louisiana's sparse population and lack of an important railroad. Further,

the Red River was a vital supply line for war supplies brought from European sources through Mexico. That river was simultaneously an avenue of approach to the state's interior.

g. Florida and Texas, eleventh and ninth in population, respectively, among the Confederate States, were susceptible to the same type of defensive problems that plagued the other coastal states. Jacksonville and Pensacola were important Florida ports, as was Galveston in Texas; however, the utility of the latter was diminished because of the lack of a railroad to connect it to the interior. Obviously, support from, and by, Texas to the major part of the Confederacy east of the Mississippi River, as in the case of Arkansas, was subject to Confederate control of the river.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER IV

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

The American Civil War was larger in terms of the size of units committed, larger in the scale of campaigns waged and battles fought, and larger in the scope of involvement of the societies and individuals represented than any previous conflict that its participants had experienced. The war incorporated the use of more compact and long range destructive power, faster mass transportation, and more rapid means of communications than any previous major war. Frequently termed the first modern war, it was unequivocally a total war. Total war requires a total strategy that considers every facet of life, and the military strategy component of that total must be developed in consonance with the whole.¹

THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES

Regardless of the source, derivation, evolution, or development of the military strategies of the American Civil War, the ultimate responsibility for them resided in the respective Commanders-in-Chief, Presidents Lincoln and Davis. In order to accomplish the national policy

objectives of restoring and preserving the Union, the military strategy of the United States was necessarily offensive. The originator of the Union's first military strategy at national level is not known with certainty, but, with little doubt, that strategy grew out of considerations of Lincoln, his Cabinet, and the General-in-Chief of the Army, Winfield Scott.

Lincoln's Attorney General, Edward Bates, recorded in his diary that he (Bates) presented a memorandum to the President's Cabinet on April 15, 1861, recommending measures that should be taken by the United States in conducting the war. These measures included: (a) stop mail to seceded states; (b) close the Southern ports, at least from Charleston to New Orleans; (c) prevent passage at the mouth of the Mississippi River; (d) control the Lake Ponchartrain approach to New Orleans; (e) command the Mississippi River, relating to navigation and trade, at the mouth of the Ohio River; (f) insure the safety of St. Louis; (g) protect Washington, the seat of government; (h) command Chesapeake Bay and maintain Fort Monroe; (i) protect Harpers Ferry and Gosport Navy Yard, if possible.

Bates favored the use of the blockade, because it projected mission accomplishment with a savings in lives; but he added that, if more warlike methods were to be used, New Orleans should be seized.²

On April 25, 1861, John Hay, one of Lincoln's secretaries, recorded a statement by Lincoln:

I intend at present, always leaving an opportunity for change of mind, to fill Fortress Monroe with men and stores, blockade the ports effectually, provide for the entire safety of the Capital, keep them quietly employed in this way, and then go down to Charleston and pay her the little debt we are owing her....³

The credit for the general outline of the United States' national military strategy at the opening of the war is usually given to General Winfield Scott. In writing to Major General George B. McClellan, commanding Ohio Volunteers at Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 3 and May 21, 1861, Scott projected the following plan:

a. The government would raise an additional 25,000 regular troops and 60,000 volunteers for three years of service.

b. Atlantic and Gulf ports would be blockaded. An expedition would move down the Mississippi River, capturing Confederate batteries, establishing posts, and capturing the forts protecting New Orleans. New Orleans would be captured.

c. The greatest obstacle to the plan would be the impatience of "patriotic and loyal Union friends," who would urge instant and vigorous action before sufficient training could be completed.⁴

Scott's prediction was correct. Newspapers of the day were harshly critical of the plan, because of

what their editors considered a wasted summer of building up forces. This strategy, developed by the Old General, was derided as "Scott's Anaconda."⁵

Generally, historians have justifiably praised Lincoln as a military strategist. Virtually untrained in military science, his instinctive grasp of the pertinent facts and accurate assessment of their proper value were reflected in his conduct of the war.⁶ The case for the Union's wartime President is presented accurately by T. Harry Williams:

The policy of the government was to restore the Union by force; the strategy perforce had to be offensive. Lincoln knew that numbers, material resources, and sea power were on his side, so he called for 400,000 troops and proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederacy....He grasped immediately the advantage that numbers gave the North and urged his generals to keep up a constant pressure on the whole strategic line of the Confederacy until a weak spot was found—and a breakthrough could be made. He soon realized, if he did not know from the beginning, that the proper objective of his armies was the destruction of the Confederate armies and not the occupation of Southern territory.⁷

In order to accomplish the national policy objective of retaining independence for the Union, the military strategy of the Confederate States would be the prevention of the destruction of its armies and government by military forces of the United States—a defensive strategy.⁸

The Confederate States had no national plan of military strategy of the type that was developed by the

Union. Jefferson Davis' choice of a defensive strategy was based upon his desire that the Confederacy avoid the appearance of being a strategic aggressor, for the benefit of perceptions in Europe, the United States, and the Confederate States themselves. The Confederacy was fighting for separation from the Union, not for territorial gains. Davis and other members of the Confederate leadership believed that Great Britain and France would find the lack of Confederate States' cotton so intolerable that one or both of these countries would intervene to assist the Confederacy in achieving separation from the Union. Davis hoped that public sympathy in those nations and Confederate friends in the United States would be attracted to the Confederacy's non-aggressive struggle for independence. Related to this same concept was the Confederate reasoning that a loss of Confederate territory would indicate that the Confederacy was not viable and worthy of foreign recognition. Further, a tenacious Confederate defense could wear down the will of the people in the United States and cause them to discontinue the war. In addition, a defensive strategy would accommodate the continuing pressures from Confederate state and local officials for home defense against an anticipated invasion of Union forces.

The shortage of transportation means within the Confederacy required that industrial centers be decentralized.

When decentralization was impossible, due to facility size or required proximity to natural resources, the defense of industrial centers was of extreme importance. As the war progressed and the effects of the Union blockade on the shortage of Confederate military supplies became more serious, the Confederate leadership would be unable to forecast the ability to supply offensive operations, and, as a result, would become still more defensive in outlook.

Davis' defensive strategy begrudged every inch of territory given up. Early in the war there was concern within the Confederacy that Union invasion would signal slave insurrections. The defensive strategy would counter this supposed menace. Davis considered that area which had been occupied by Union forces would be virtually worthless to the Confederacy thereafter, and the Confederate Army could ill afford the loss of supply, subsistence, and recruitment sources that was inherent in any loss of territory. Further, as more area was given up to the invader, more soldiers would desert their units to defend their respective homes.⁹

The military departmental command system, organized in 1861 by the Confederate government to administer its military forces throughout the Confederate States, became a significant influence on Confederate military strategy. Each department was commanded by a

general who possessed military forces and was charged with the defense of a specific area. Davis granted considerable autonomy to each department commander, who was responsible for offensive and defensive planning within his jurisdiction and had an influential voice, if not the final determination, of prospective reinforcement of, or cooperative effort with, another department. The military aspects of a departmental system were designed to provide decentralized command, control, and defense over a vast geographical area to a national government hampered by poor communications and transportation systems. Lacking intelligence of Union Army intentions and adequate means to obtain this intelligence, the Confederacy established, in conjunction with its departmental system, a necessarily thin cordon defense across its frontier with the United States. Considering the troops and weapons that were available to the Confederate Army, the success of the cordon defense was not possible, and various Confederate generals began to assert the need for concentration of forces to confront invading Union columns from June, 1861, onward. Elimination of small departments and consolidation of others began in Virginia in the fall of 1861. In October of that year the Department of Northern Virginia was established. It was organized by the consolidation of three former commands, and two additional departments were incorporated within it in

April, 1862. The trend toward consolidation would continue in the West during 1862, gradually giving fewer departmental commanders greater control as the war progressed.¹⁰ The use of an offensive-defensive strategy would increase, also, and, as the Union offensive developed, the Confederate defense conformed to meet it or reacted to counter it.

Military strategy within theaters was influenced particularly by the nature of the vital areas to be defended, the avenues of approach, and characteristics of the theater commanders.

Both the Confederacy and the Union have been criticized for their respective strategies in Virginia, which, based on a fixation on their capitals, caused an allegedly inordinately large concentration of forces and effort in that theater in comparison to the war in the West.¹¹ Confederate strategy in Virginia after June, 1862, was General Robert E. Lee's strategy. Basically, Lee defended Richmond against the Union Army with an offensive-defensive strategy, and, for more than two years, was a real or perceived threat to Washington. Mitigation of the arguments against the Union's emphasis on relentless campaigns before Richmond and the Confederacy's costly defense of that city can be found in consideration that:

- a. Richmond and Washington were symbols of

significant importance to the people of the Union and the Confederacy, and their fate was of diplomatic interest to Great Britain and France, while those countries deliberated the possibilities of intervention in the war or continued aid to the Confederate States.

b. Richmond was vital as an arsenal that provided unique support to the war effort of the whole Confederacy.¹²

c. As a transportation center, Richmond was necessary to the defense of Virginia. Virginia was the most vital and influential state which had seceded, and particularly after the loss of Tennessee, the Confederate States could not afford to lose it.

Richmond was ill-chosen as a wartime capital, and the function of the capital could have been located at any of several places more easily protected. However, once it was designated the Confederate seat of government, its evacuation would have been of significant deleterious effect on the morale of the secessionists. Lincoln learned and Grant knew that the vital target for the Union Army in Virginia was the Confederate Army in Virginia, with Richmond a plum that would fall if the Confederate Army failed.

The Confederate Navy was authorized by the Confederate States Congress on February 21, 1861, and was increased in size on April 21 of the same year. Stephen

R. Mallory was appointed the Secretary of the Navy of the Confederate States. As a former chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, he was well-suited to his task in comparison to most of his contemporaries in the Confederate Cabinet. His accomplishments would reflect his competence and application. At the beginning of the war the Confederate Navy consisted of six revenue cutters, a steam tender, a few coastwise steamers, and two Coast Survey steamers seized by the seceding states.¹³ Of the two existing shipyards, the facility at Pensacola had been equipped for maintenance and repairs only. The construction yard at Norfolk, which became available only after Virginia's secession, was damaged by the Unionists before they abandoned it, but was a windfall to a "have-not" navy.¹⁴ About one-fifth of the naval officers of the United States Navy resigned from that service in favor of their seceding home states. With these assets as a nucleus, Mallory would build a navy that would perform with credit against the blockade of "Scott's Anaconda."

The object of Confederate naval strategy was to render the Union's blockade ineffective. The principal components of that strategy included privateering, blockade running, commerce raiding, and the use of new types of warships whose construction Mallory encouraged—ironclads, torpedo boats, and submarines.

a. Fifty-three ships were commissioned as Confederate privateers in answer to President Davis' invitation on April 17, 1861. The prospective benefits to be derived by the privateers were the profits from the sale of captured goods in Confederate or foreign ports or, for those who would dare attack and capture a United States Navy ship, a bounty from the Confederate government. The strategical gain of the Confederacy was distraction of the Union Navy from its blockade mission, damage to the United States economy, and harassment of merchants and shipowners that might nourish anti-war sentiment. The Confederate privateers' effectiveness was severely limited, because the Union blockade prevented their prize ships from going into Confederate ports. Neither would foreign nations authorize entrance of the prize ships into their ports. In addition, President Lincoln declared in his proclamation of the blockade that,

...if any person, under the pretended authority of the said [seceded] States, or under any pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy.¹⁵

Most of the privateers became more attracted to the more profitable enterprise of blockade running.

b. Blockade running was the transport of war-essential and commercial cargo from foreign ports through the Union Navy blockade to Confederate ports. Ships that were built specifically for this purpose were long,

narrow, low-profile steamships painted dull gray and burning anthracite coal to avoid detection. Operating primarily at night, they relied on speed and evasive action to escape when they were detected. Civilian owned blockade runners were not regulated by the government, and often brought in luxury items on which the shipowners made profits of 100 to 200 per cent, even before the depreciation of Confederate money.¹⁶

c. The commerce raiders (Confederate cruisers) were fast, lightly armed Confederate Navy ships whose mission was to capture or destroy United States shipping, and thereby entice the Union Navy to weaken the blockade by detaching ships to pursue the raiders. Although some of the commerce raiders, such as the British-built CSS Alabama and CSS Florida, would build-up impressive individual records, the total program would not be successful in breaking the blockade.¹⁷

d. The Confederate Navy Department developed crude mines, which could be detonated on contact or by an electrical current. These devices would sink or disable 32 Union vessels and have a deterrent effect upon Union mariners, who knew of their destructiveness and suspected their emplacement. The Navy Department would also build one true submarine, several torpedo boats, and a limited number of ironclads. One of the latter would become famous; a burned inheritance from the Union

Navy—repaired, armored, and armed and renamed the Virginia.

The Confederate States had no national strategic plan for the employment of guerrilla operations. As could be expected in a civil war, guerrilla organizations would evolve, and their operations would take on the characteristics of their individual leaders. The Confederate government would approve the formation of Partisan Ranger units, giving them certain aspects of regular troop status and permitting them to live as civilians and to operate behind enemy lines. Their typical missions were to (a) prevent Union forces from obtaining information concerning the strength and location of regular Confederate units; (b) obtain timely information concerning Union force size and disposition; (c) disrupt supply and communication lines, thereby compelling Union forces to detach large contingents to protect Union rear areas; (d) and to provide guides for Regular Army forces operating in the vicinity of the Partisan Ranger base areas.

The effectiveness of guerrilla operations and their positive contribution to the total war effort were proportionate to the command, control, and coordination exerted by the Regular Army establishment with which they were associated. In April, 1864, General Lee would recommend the disbanding of all the Partisan Ranger units operating within his department except the battalion of

Colonel John S. Mosby. At that time, Lee expressed the difficulties in maintaining discipline in the guerrilla organizations and in preventing them from becoming an injury to the service. His objections were centered upon the depredations committed by guerrillas and the temptation for soldiers to desert Regular Army units to join guerrilla organizations.¹⁸ National policy guidance and direction and coordination of guerrilla operations by army commanders in the field could have made guerrilla operations a significantly greater influence on the Confederate war effort. Instead, on the Missouri-Kansas border, William C. Quantrill would continue his prewar feud with the Kansas "Jayhawkers" with questionable sanction by the Confederate government. However, he would be used effectively as a complement to Regular Confederate forces operating in his area. Quantrill would die of a wound received in his attempted capture by Union troops in May, 1865. On the Middle Tennessee-Kentucky border, a partisan of less renown than Mosby or Quantrill was Champ Furguson, who would wage an irregular war on a personal basis against Union regulars, irregulars, and sympathizers. After the war, Furguson would be convicted of murder by a Union military court and executed. Mosby's battalion would increase in valuable service through the last year of the war in Virginia. After Lee's surrender, Mosby would disband his unit and receive a parole from General Grant.¹⁹

ONWARD TO RICHMOND

By July, 1861, the Confederate States forces held all the former United States fortifications on the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts south of the entrance of Chesapeake Bay except Fort Pickens, at the entrance of Pensacola Harbor, Florida, and the forts on the islands in the Gulf of Mexico. Mobilization had reached a level that would allow limited hostilities but, at this stage, the zeal of the firebrands exceeded the staying power of the combatants.

Major General George B. McClellan's campaign into Western Virginia, to secure that area for its continued support of the Union, was successful through June and July, 1861. McClellan was then reassigned to Washington and was replaced in Western Virginia by Brigadier General William S. Rosecrans. General Robert E. Lee was sent to Western Virginia in August to recover the Confederate losses sustained before that time. Forces subordinate to Lee were subsequently defeated in September, 1861. Lee was assigned to South Carolina, and most of the Confederate forces in Western Virginia were sent to other commands.²⁰ The loss of Western Virginia, from the viewpoint of the Confederacy, was regrettable, but hardly preventable or recoverable. Considering the 20,000 man force that the Union committed to the campaign, the proximity of the area to the Union's heartland, and the

Unionist attitude of a significant part of the population, the Confederacy could ill afford the commitment of a force that would be large enough to retake and hold Western Virginia.

Soon after Fort Sumter, President Lincoln appointed Brigadier General Irvin McDowell to command the Union Army of slightly over 30,000 men near Washington. Both McDowell and General Winfield Scott considered that this army, consisting mostly of three months militia whose term of service would soon expire, could not be trained well enough for a campaign. Nevertheless, Congressmen and the press condemned procrastination loudly and took up the cry "Onward to Richmond." Over the protests of Scott and McDowell, Lincoln ordered an immediate offensive. The plan was for McDowell with a force of 30,600 men to attack Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard's 18,000 man force on Bull Run at Manassas, Virginia. For McDowell's attack to succeed, Union Major General Robert Patterson with a force of 14,000 men would have to prevent Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston with a force of 10,500 at Winchester, Virginia, from reinforcing Beauregard. The Confederates received early notice of McDowell's advance and reinforced Beauregard locally, while President Davis ordered Johnston to move to Beauregard's aid. McDowell's movement to contact was slow. Patterson did not deter Johnston, and Johnston joined Beauregard in time for the

combined Confederate forces to rout McDowell after an initially close battle.²¹ Aside from a disappointment that the Confederate Army did not pursue McDowell into Washington, the Confederate victory at Bull Run was a cause of elation and overconfidence within the Confederate States. In the North, Unionists tightened their belts with a new resolve.

On July 22, Lincoln summoned Major General George B. McClellan to Washington. He would replace McDowell. On the following day, the President of the United States wrote a Memoranda of Military Policy Suggested by the Bull Run Defeat. Concisely and powerfully to the point, he proposed: (a) make the blockade effective, quickly; (b) train the troops at Fort Monroe diligently; (c) continue to hold Baltimore with "a gentle, but firm, and certain hand;" (d) strengthen Patterson's force and secure its position (Harpers Ferry) (Patterson was relieved by General Nathaniel P. Banks on July 19, 1861, with an effective date of July 27.); (e) Major General McClellan would continue to control the forces in Western Virginia from Washington; (f) General John C. Fremont (Commanding General, Department of the West, with headquarters in St. Louis) must expedite his organization and operation with special attention to Missouri; (g) reorganize the veterans of Bull Run minus the three months volunteers; (h) discharge the three months volunteers who decline to

enter longer service as soon as possible; (i) expedite the training of the new volunteers.²²

In Missouri, Major General Sterling Price, Commanding General of the military element of Confederate sympathizers in that state, requested military assistance from the Confederacy. In August, 1861, independent Confederate commands under Price, Brigadier General Ben McCulloch, Brigadier General William J. Hardee, and Brigadier General Gideon J. Pillow planned to cooperate in an advance to St. Louis. This plan was obviated after the Battle of Wilson's Creek, Missouri, on August 10, which Price and McCulloch won but were unable to exploit. McCulloch determined that his ill-armed and ill-supplied men were in no condition to pursue and withdrew to Arkansas. Price continued to operate in Missouri with limited success until General Fremont threatened his line of communications with a Union force of significant strength. Price then withdrew to the vicinity of Springfield, where he remained until the following spring. Regular Army operations within Missouri declined during the remainder of 1861. Confederate forces, other than those of Missouri, withdrew in September, while guerrilla warfare continued and grew.

Early in September the nominal neutrality of Kentucky was broken when the Confederate army commanded by General Polk and his successor, General Albert Sidney Johnston occupied positions in the southern part of the

state. The Union Army countered with similar moves in Northern Kentucky. There were no significant engagements within Kentucky during 1861, but Union and Confederate forces continued to consolidate their positions. The Confederate line ran generally from Cumberland Gap via Barboursville, Monticello, Bowling Green, Hopkinsville, Fort Donelson (on the Cumberland River), Fort Henry (on the Tennessee River), and Union City, Tennessee to Columbus. General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded this line from Bowling Green. Major General George E. Crittenden commanded the Confederate forces on the upper Cumberland River, and Major General Polk those west of the Tennessee River. Union forces occupied a line running from Pikeville in Eastern Kentucky via Booneville, London, Somerset, Columbia, Munfordville, Elizabethtown, Calhoun, Smithland, and Paducah to Cairo, Illinois. In November, 1861, the part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River was assigned to the Department of the Missouri, commanded by Major General Henry W. Halleck. The remainder of Kentucky was assigned to the Department of the Ohio, commanded by Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell.

In May, 1861, a division under Union Major General Benjamin F. Butler had reinforced the garrison at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and occupied the fort's outlying territory, which became the Department of Southeast Virginia. In the latter part of August, Butler in cooperation with

Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham captured the Confederate forts Hatteras and Clark at the entrance to Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, and a brigade was left as a permanent garrison in that area of the coast. On November 7, another joint operation of the Union Army and Navy bombarded and seized Confederate forts Beauregard and Walker at the entrance of Port Royal Sound. The principals were Flag Officer Samuel F. Du Pont and Brigadier General Thomas W. Sherman. Port Royal Sound would be a base of operations for continuing coastal operations. The most effective complement of the blockade had begun—operations to seize the Confederate ports.²³

In October, 1861, General Joseph E. Johnston, sustained by Generals P. G. T. Beauregard and Gustavus W. Smith, submitted a proposed plan to Jefferson Davis illustrating the value of concentration and proposing it as a preliminary for partial concentration of forces from Pensacola, Savannah, Norfolk, Yorktown, and Fredericksburg combined with Johnston's army to launch a campaign across the Potomac River before General McClellan had completed the organization of the Union army. Davis refused.²⁴ Thus, the President rejected a regional offensive-defensive strategy and chose to continue relying on a cordon defense.

ANTETAM AND EMANCIPATION, 1862

By the beginning of 1862 Lincoln was, again, under tremendous pressure from Congress and the public for the army to go on the offensive. Perhaps over-reacting, on January 27 he published General Order Number I, which directed a general movement of land and naval forces against the enemy.²⁵ During the winter, General McClellan had not moved, nor shown the inclination to take offensive action. Meanwhile, the Confederate "have-not" Navy had established a blockade of the lower Potomac River and, with the army, tenuously held Norfolk. In Special War Order Number I on January 31, Lincoln directed McClellan to seize and occupy a point upon the railroad southwest of Manassas.²⁶ McClellan objected, pointing out the advantages of a move by water to Urbana, on the Rappahannock River and then overland to Richmond. This plan was debated. Lincoln favored the direct land approach due to his concern for the security of Washington, but in early March approved McClellan's proposed plan. On March 9, the Confederate Army moved, thereby spoiling the Urbana plan. McClellan then proposed to move to Fort Monroe and from there up the Peninsula to Richmond. Lincoln approved the plan grudgingly.²⁷

McClellan departed on April 1. On April 4, Lincoln decided that McClellan had left an inadequate

force to cover Washington and detached the corps of Major General McDowell from McClellan's troop list for that purpose. The Confederate Army commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston gathered to oppose McClellan in the vicinity of Yorktown. Union forces numbered 112,000 men, the Confederates, 60,000. McClellan's siege of Yorktown began on April 5, and Johnston withdrew. Major General Thomas J. Jackson's lightning campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, defeating Major General Fremont near Staunton (May 8) and Major General Banks at Front Royal and Winchester (May 23-25), prevented General McDowell's force from joining McClellan. On May 31-June 1, General Johnston counter-attacked a portion of McClellan's army at Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks) unsuccessfully, and was wounded. McClellan's advance ended within five miles of Richmond. General Robert E. Lee was assigned to replace the wounded Johnston in command of the Army of Northern Virginia.

With his back to Richmond, Lee had to decide between "the positive loss of inactivity and the risk of action."²⁸ Lee took the initiative and went on the offensive. He concentrated his forces, to include calling General Jackson with his command from the Shenandoah. With heavy casualties to his own forces, Lee drove McClellan in a series of assaults between June 26 and July 1, 1862, that would become known as the Seven Days Battles. McClellan's Peninsula Campaign was closed, and within a

month the Army of the Potomac was withdrawn to northern Virginia.

Choosing not to employ a cordon defense in Virginia like that used in the Western Confederacy, General Lee continued on the offensive-defensive and defeated a Union force (the Army of Virginia) commanded by Major General John Pope on the Manassas plains on August 30, 1862. Lee took the chance of dividing his force to outmaneuver Pope and succeeded, largely due to the ingenuity of Jackson and the marching ability of Jackson's corps, which covered a distance of twenty-one miles each day on August 25 and 26.

General Lee needed to subsist the Army of Northern Virginia for awhile elsewhere than in Virginia, knowing that he would have to return there for the winter. He wanted to give Marylanders an opportunity to enlist in the cause of the Confederacy, possibly to secede, and thereby surround Washington with belligerents.²⁹ Some of Lee's troops balked at leaving the righteous defense of their nation and invading another. President Davis was concerned over the risk of a Union Army campaign against Richmond and the possibility of agitating the Marylanders. Lee's advance into Maryland was to be coordinated with a similar move by General Braxton Bragg and the Army of Tennessee into Kentucky. As failure by Lee could expose Richmond, failure by Bragg would expose

the entire Mississippi Basin to the Union armies in the West. But a successful operation by Bragg might earn thousands of Kentucky recruits, win the whole state of Kentucky, or ignite the Northwest Conspiracy. Davis sought to get the most benefits possible from the risks being taken. On September 7, 1862, he wrote a letter addressed to Lee and Bragg, which included a proclamation to be published by the generals in Maryland and Kentucky. The proclamation included insurances that the Confederate government (a) was waging war solely for self-defense; (b) had no intentions of prohibiting the use of the Mississippi River; (c) desired peaceful separation from the United States; (d) had been prevented from renewing proposals for peace. Finally, the Confederate Army had come to occupy the territory of its enemies, and it was within the power of the occupied state to negotiate peace with the Confederacy, if the Union would not.³⁰

This was a political statement of the Confederacy's attitude of freedom, determination, and quest for peace delivered by the military arm of diplomacy.

Lee crossed the Potomac River on September 4, and concentrated his forces at Frederick, Maryland. General Jackson was detached with supporting forces to capture the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. General Longstreet continued to Hagerstown. General McClellan was sent by Lincoln to intercept Lee,

and was apprised of Lee's operations plan when a copy of it was found by Union soldiers. McClellan's advance was slowed by an engagement fought with a portion of Lee's forces under Major General D. H. Hill at South Mountain on September 14. Jackson captured Harpers Ferry and its garrison of 12,500 men on September 15, and marched to join Lee and Longstreet along the Antietam Creek near Sharpsburg, Maryland. There McClellan assailed Lee unsuccessfully on September 16-17. Neither general renewed the attack on the 18th, and on that night, Lee recrossed the Potomac into Virginia. Jackson's gains at Harpers Ferry could not pay for the Confederate casualties at Antietam--more than 13,000 men in the bloodiest single day of the war. Lee declined the opportunity to avoid the battle, because he believed that he could beat McClellan. "It would seem...that Lee was unable to discriminate between the human limit of his own army and the spirit with which his men fought."³¹ McClellan did not pursue. On November 7, he was relieved.

Although Antietam was a tactical draw, it was a strategic victory for the Union of sufficient significance for Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing the slaves in the Confederate States. Knowing that the proclamation would have to be issued from a position of strength, Lincoln deemed the time right. The proclamation had the effect of military strategy.

Nations in Europe, where slavery was already abolished, would hesitate now before they rendered further aid to the slaveholding Confederacy. With the border states either already secure or battlegrounds, Lincoln could safely move for more abolitionist support or justify that which was already in evidence. The Emancipation Proclamation could be a determinant of the war.

Major General Ambrose E. Burnside replaced General McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac. His plan to move the army across to the south side of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg was approved on November 14. Delay in receiving pontoons with which to cross allowed Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia to prepare positions overlooking Fredericksburg. Regardless, Burnside attacked the Confederate line and was beaten, suffering severe losses.

By the close of 1862, Union forces in the East had seized or occupied Yorktown and Norfolk, Virginia; Beaufort and Newbern, North Carolina; Fort Pulaski, Georgia; St. Augustine, Fernandina, and Pensacola, Florida, in addition to the ports and coastal installations captured in 1861. They had failed, however, to win their most important strategic objectives, the capture of Lee's army and of Richmond.

In 1862 Lee had partially blunted the Eastern thrust of what was to become a three pronged thrust of

Union military power into the Confederacy. Confederate arms in the West did not fare as well.

Lincoln had written to Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell, commanding the Department of the Ohio, on January 13, 1862, saying that he wanted Major General Henry W. Halleck (C. G. Department of the Missouri) to advance from St. Louis along the Mississippi River, while Buell, from Louisville, pushed into East Tennessee. His thesis was based upon the advantages to be accrued from applying pressure against several points simultaneously, and the opportunity to justify the Unionist support that could be anticipated in East Tennessee. Buell correctly insisted that the preferred route to advance on Knoxville was by way of Nashville, and he was right, considering the mountainous region and poor, bushwhacked roads that he would have to traverse in eastern Kentucky and Tennessee.

Buell had been one of the first highly placed Union officers to see the prospects of an advance into Tennessee along the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, in recommendations to General McClellan in November, 1861, and to Major General Halleck in January, 1862. Halleck had appreciated the same fact the previous year in December. Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant saw the possibilities of the operation, in coordination with Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote and the river gunboats of the Union Navy.

On January 28, Halleck gave Grant authorization to plan the campaign. Grant, with gunboat support from Foote and Commodore William D. Porter, captured Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, February 6, and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, February 16.

The fall of these forts dictated the immediate evacuation of the Confederate line in Kentucky and left Nashville without defense. General Albert Sidney Johnston's rear guard left Nashville on February 23. General Buell's forces entered that city on the 25th. Kentucky was cleared of Confederate forces, and the loss of Nashville's industrial capacity by the Confederacy was irreparable.³² Thus, the Confederacy's cordon defense of the long line from the Appalachians to the Mississippi River had failed.

In June, 1861, General Beauregard had advocated an alternative to such a cordon defense, namely, the concentration of forces. General Joseph E. Johnston had also approached President Davis on the subject of concentrating forces and going on the offensive. Lee had concentrated forces into a formidable army and had in fact gone on the offensive. On February 15, 1862, Major General Braxton Bragg wrote to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin recommending the concentration of forces and the offensive:

Our means and resources are much too scattered. The protection of purposes and property, as such, should be abandoned, and all our means applied to

the government and the cause. Important strategic points only should be held. All means not necessary to secure these should be concentrated for a heavy blow upon the enemy where we can best assail him. Kentucky is now that point. On the Gulf we should only hold New Orleans, Mobile and Pensacola; all other points, the whole of Texas and Florida, should be abandoned, and our means there made available for other service. A small loss of property would result from their occupation by the enemy; but our military strength would not be lessened thereby, whilst the enemy would be weakened by dispersion. We could then beat him in detail, instead of the reverse. The same remark applies to our Atlantic seaboard. In Missouri the same rule can be applied to a great extent. Deploring the misfortunes of that gallant people, I can but think their relief must reach them through Kentucky.³³

Though hitherto his actions indicated that he favored the cordon defense, after the collapse of Johnston's line in Kentucky and Tennessee Davis accepted such counsel enough to approve at least three major offensive plans during 1862.

Shocked by the Union successes at Forts Henry and Donelson, Davis had collected officers and troops to bolster General A. S. Johnston. Beauregard organized units in Mississippi; Major General Braxton Bragg was sent with 10,000 men from Pensacola; and, by April 1, a Confederate Army was assembled at Corinth, Mississippi. Sixteen brigades, formed into four elements under General Johnston, attacked a Union force commanded by General Grant near Shiloh Church (Pittsburg Landing) on the Tennessee River about twenty-five miles northeast of Corinth, on April 6-7. General Johnston was killed on the first day and was succeeded by General Beauregard. Grant was reinforced

during the night, and the Confederates were beaten on the 7th. Beauregard withdrew to Corinth. The Union forces were too spent to pursue.

Continuing to implement Union strategy to clear the Mississippi River, forces under Major General John Pope defeated Confederates at New Madrid, Missouri, and captured Island No. 10 during March and April. The river was then under Union control north of Fort Pillow (forty miles upstream from Memphis).

General Halleck assumed command of the Union forces at Shiloh and advanced toward Corinth, which General Beauregard evacuated without a battle. Union capture of Corinth uncovered Fort Pillow and Memphis. Union gunboats defeated the Confederate river fleet at Memphis on June 5, and, on the following day, a Union regiment occupied that city. The Mississippi River was opened to Union shipping from the Ohio River to Vicksburg, Mississippi.

Halleck chose not to follow Beauregard, but, instead, consolidated Union gains in Tennessee. In June Buell moved east along the railroad to capture Chattanooga. Bragg was promoted to general, and in July moved with an army to operate against Buell. On July 11, Halleck became the Union Army's General-in-Chief in Washington. General Grant was given Halleck's former command.

In mid-August Confederate Major General Kirby

Smith invaded eastern Kentucky with three divisions. His advance was stopped by Union reinforcements provided by adjacent Union states and the organization of a new Department of the Ohio.

Kirby Smith's advance had been designed to be coordinated with one by Bragg. On August 26, General Bragg's army crossed the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga, flanked General Buell, and reached Glassgow, Kentucky, on September 13. Bragg installed a Confederate governor at Frankfort on October 4. Buell withdrew to Kentucky and fought an indecisive battle with Bragg on October 8 at Perryville. Bragg withdrew into Tennessee. Buell discontinued his pursuit of Bragg and was relieved on October 30 by Major General William S. Rosecrans.

President Davis had approved Bragg's invasion of Kentucky, hopeful of winning recruits (Bragg had wagon loads of weapons with which to arm them.), perhaps to win the state, and with the possibility of Bragg's continuing into Ohio. Bragg did not win a great victory, which might have swayed prospective recruits. Few enlistments were made. Regardless of their sentiment, the Kentuckians were not convinced of Confederate power. A major tragedy of the campaign from the viewpoint of the Confederacy was that at the decisive point, Kirby Smith and Bragg's armies were more than 100 miles apart. There was a willingness to cooperate, but a lack of unity of command.³⁴ Both Lee's

experiment in Maryland and Bragg's experiment in Kentucky were cut short before they had time to succeed by the Confederate loss of major battles at Antietam and Perryville, respectively.

Bragg assembled and reorganized his army at Murfreesboro, and from that time it was designated the Army of Tennessee. Rosecrans' and Bragg's armies fought at Murfreesboro (Stone River) on December 31 and January 2, 1863. There were heavy casualties in both armies, but the battle was indecisive. Bragg withdrew to Shelbyville, Tennessee, on the 3rd and 4th, and was not pursued.

The contest for Missouri was lost by the Confederacy at the Battle of Pea Ridge (Elkhorn Tavern), Arkansas on March 7-8, 1862. Major General Earl Van Dorn, who had been sent by Jefferson Davis in January to organize and command the Confederate troops in the Trans-Mississippi District, united with Missourian Major General Sterling Price in Arkansas in March, and at Pea Ridge engaged a smaller Union force under Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis. Casualties were heavy in both armies. Confederate Brigadier General Ben McCulloch was killed. Van Dorn was defeated and withdrew. Except for the continuing bloody guerrilla war, Missouri was in permanent possession of the Union.

The grip of "Scott's Anaconda" closed more tightly in April, 1862, when on the 24th Admiral

G. Farragut passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip six miles south of New Orleans, and entered that city on April 25. The forts were then occupied by a regiment under Major General Ben Butler, who proceeded into the city on May 1. Farragut proceeded up river to Vicksburg and bombarded Vicksburg intermittently from May 18 until June 14, with indecisive effect. Operations on the Mississippi River demonstrated that land forts alone could not stop the passage of wooden ships, nor could a fleet alone silence land-based batteries.

After the failures of the Confederates in both cordon defense and temporary concentrations for the offensive, by the close of 1862 in the West Union troops possessed Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee; Helena, Arkansas; New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and the state of Kentucky.³⁵

THE HIGHWATER MARK, 1863

Major General Joseph Hooker replaced General Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac on January 26, 1863. President Lincoln, in a letter to Hooker, expressed confidence in the general, cautioned him against overambition, criticism of superiors, and overrashness, promised him the support of the President, and asked of Hooker to "...give us victories."³⁶

General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, minus

elements of Longstreet's corps and two cavalry brigades, was on the south bank o. the Rappahannock River near Fredericksburg. Late in April Hooker sent a large cavalry force to cut Lee's lines of communications. Meanwhile, Hooker crossed the Rappahannock River with four corps in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. By May 2, Lee's army was concentrated five miles away at Tabernacle Church. On May 3, Lieutenant General Thomas J. Jackson's corps turned Hooker's right flank, and Lee's army defeated Hooker in the battle that ensued. Hooker retired across the Rappahannock River on the night of the 4th. Chancellorsville, one of Lee's greatest victories, was marred by the loss of his great "right arm." Jackson was inadvertently wounded by his own men and died of pneumonia on May 10. Strategically, the Army of the Potomac was no nearer to Richmond, but the Confederacy could not win a war of attrition.

General Lee was determined to advance into Pennsylvania. Harrisburg had been a prospective objective of the Maryland Campaign that had not been realized. According to Edwin B. Coddington, Lee's purposes were to threaten Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia; to subsist on the countryside of Pennsylvania; to avoid a "general" or pitched battle; and to try to catch the Union army off guard and destroy it, piecemeal. Colonel A. L. Long, once military secretary to Lee, also projected the

possibility of a defeat of the Army of the Potomac, so severe that Northern Peace Democrats would agitate against continued prosecution of the war and for a negotiated peace.³⁷ Lee's incursion into Pennsylvania was not without justification, or without justifiable opposition in Confederate councils. As in the pre-Maryland Campaign considerations, there was the possibility of losing Richmond, but, in addition, without reinforcements represented in some of the troops that Lee proposed to take with him, Vicksburg, one of two Confederate bastions remaining on the Mississippi River, might fall.³⁸ The Confederacy staked its hopes on one big offensive, and hoped that its defenses would hold.

Lee moved, planning to avoid a battle in Virginia by marching parallel to the Rappahannock and entering the Shenandoah Valley at Front Royal. He could then follow the valley to the Potomac and march either on Frederick, Washington, Baltimore, or Harrisburg. He left a delaying force at Fredericksburg in the event that Union forces should cross there bound for Richmond. Hooker suspected Lee's intentions, and requested to cross the river at Fredericksburg, attack the forces there, and move on Richmond. Lincoln declined. Hooker was directed to cover Washington and Harpers Ferry, and attack Lee wherever possible north of the Rappahannock River. On June 28, Lee was near Chambersburg with the corps of

Longstreet and Lieutenant General A. P. Hill; Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell was at Carlisle with two divisions. His third division, commanded by Major General Jubal A. Early, was at York. Major General J. E. B. Stuart with three brigades of cavalry was in Rockville, Maryland, and had been out of contact with the main army for several days. Acting on information from a spy that the Union army was in Frederick, Maryland, Lee became apprehensive for his line of communications and ordered a concentration of his forces at Cashtown, near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. General Hooker was replaced as Commander of the Army of the Potomac on the night of the 28th by Major General George G. Meade.

Meade was directed to cover Washington and Baltimore, but not to remain on the defensive unless required to do so. Knowing the general location of Lee's army, Meade advanced toward Gettysburg. Contact was made by elements of the two armies on June 30, near Gettysburg. Neither Lee nor Meade was ready for the battle which ensued on July 1-3. At Gettysburg errors in judgment, lack of coordination, lack of effective execution, and lack of resources brought the Confederacy to its so-called high-water mark. Lee withdrew to Virginia.

Echoing the comment of President Lincoln of April 25, 1861, ["I intend to] go down to Charleston and pay her the little debt we are owing her...," Union Navy

and Army forces fought diligently to seize Charleston harbor during 1863, but could not get past Fort Sumter and the harbor obstructions. Attempts at passage by the fleet, artillery, and ground assault from April through early December failed to penetrate the defense.

In accordance with "Scott's Anaconda," the Mississippi River had been cleared of Confederate posts by 1863 except for Vicksburg and Port Hudson. If these strongholds fell, the Confederate States would be split, and the men and supplies that had flowed eastward from Texas, Arkansas, Western Louisiana, and the Yazoo District of Mississippi would be lost to the Confederacy in the South and East. Vicksburg was the stronger of the two. Its defenses had repulsed an assault by Union army forces in the previous December. Late in January, 1863, General Grant took personal charge of efforts to capture the post. Seasonal highwater over the roads on most of the land approaches to Vicksburg precluded assault by foot in February and March. Grant tried by boats at Yazoo Pass, Steel Bayou, and Lake Providence to find an indirect route to the land approaches to no avail. An attempt to by-pass Vicksburg by canal failed. Grant had the choice of returning to Memphis and advancing along the Mississippi Railroad, or marching down the west side of the Mississippi River and crossing to the east side below Vicksburg. He chose the latter plan, crossing near Port

Gibson on April 30, approximately twenty-five miles below Vicksburg. Gunboats and naval transports joined him by running the Vicksburg batteries at night—the most risky part of this plan. Grant occupied Jackson, defeated Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, and drove Pemberton's forces back into Vicksburg. That city was besieged until its fall on July 4, 1863. Four days later Port Hudson surrendered to Major General Nathaniel P. Banks. The Confederacy was split. The Mississippi River was a Union thoroughfare.

On September 19 and 20, General Bragg's army won its only major victory of the war at Chickamauga and did not follow up its advantage. Instead, Bragg held General Rosecrans at bay in Chattanooga. Union occupation of Chattanooga neutralized what had been left of that city's value to the Confederacy as a transportation center and industrial complex. Loss of Chattanooga would open the gate to the second heartland of the Confederacy. Depending upon a prospective collateral success of the Union campaign in eastern Tennessee under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, a loss of Chattanooga could complete the Union's control of Tennessee.

Almost a month after the battle of Chickamauga, a revision of the Union Army's command arrangement in the West that would have a positive and unifying effect upon the tactical situation at Chattanooga and the expeditious

implementation of the Union's national military strategy was the assignment, on October 16, of General Grant as the single commander of the three Union armies in the West. At this time, the Department of the Ohio, the Department of the Cumberland, and the Department of the Tennessee east of the Mississippi River were combined into the Division of the Mississippi with Grant at its head. It is likely that the growing pains that had attended the evolution of Union command structure in the West during the first two years of the war were necessary to organize and train the army for combat, to identify the best of the commanders and staff officers, and to overcome the inertia inherent with beginning a total war. But the time was at hand or nearing when the Union forces could exploit success with the overhead reduced, and Grant and his hand-picked, campaign-tested subordinates in key positions of the army.

Chattanooga was secured for the Union by forces under General Grant in the Battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge on November 24 and 25, respectively. General Bragg retreated into Georgia. In December Bragg was relieved at his own request, and General Joseph E. Johnston was assigned to command the Army of Tennessee.

Union forces under Burnside held Knoxville against the assault of Confederate forces commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet on November 29.

But President Lincoln's strategic desire for a Union-secured Eastern Tennessee was not realized by the year's end.

WAR IS HELL, 1864-65

On March 9, 1864, Major General Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, and on the 10th was assigned to the command of the Armies of the United States. During the winter months, Grant had carried on a dialogue of strategical planning with President Lincoln by proxy. Through Charles A. Dana and General Halleck, Grant had proposed plans for seizing Mobile, which were generally disapproved by the President because of the possibility that taking the forces required would expose Chattanooga, Eastern Tennessee, and Kentucky to renewed incursions by the Confederate Army. Lincoln wanted to assure the security of Tennessee. When asked for a plan of strategy for the East, Grant's reply was a concept for making an amphibious landing on the North Carolina coast to cut the lines of communications between Richmond and the remainder of the Confederacy, thereby forcing the Confederate Army in Virginia to abandon Richmond to secure its lines of communications. This concept met with more disapproval from Lincoln, who was convinced that Confederate armies should be the military objectives. Nevertheless, Grant was the public's choice and, apparently,

the personal choice of the President for assignment as General-in-Chief.

Grant understood the necessity of establishing his headquarters near Washington, but not in Washington. He therefore retained General Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac, but located the headquarters of the General-in-Chief with that army. General Halleck was assigned as Chief of Staff of the Army, and his role, as performed for Grant, was as a communications link between Grant and the President and between Grant and his subordinates.

Grant's new strategic plan for the army in the East reflected no communications gap between the President and the General-in-Chief. Grant's direction to Meade was succinct, "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also."³⁹ In addition to Meade's orientation on the Army of Northern Virginia, Major General Benjamin F. Butler was to move from Fort Monroe up the James River to threaten Richmond and to destroy the railroads south of Richmond. In addition, a force under Major General Franz Sigel was to operate in the Shenandoah Valley.

In the West, Grant planned two major offensives. His instructions to Major General William T. Sherman were concise and in consonance with those given to Meade:

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can upon their war resources.⁴⁰

Secondly, Grant proposed that an army under Major General Nathaniel P. Banks was to move from New Orleans to Mobile. (Grant had hoped eventually to unite Sherman and Banks, similar to the principles of his former plan of operation against Mobile which had been disapproved.) However, the projected Mobile operation had to be cancelled because of the defeat of Banks in the Red River Campaign in April, 1864.

Grant emphasized a concerted and continuous effort by all forces at every possible point to crush the Confederacy by attrition. The direction to Sherman concerning the damaging of enemy war resources, although not a new concept, demonstrated Grant's understanding of total war, and, by spelling it out as policy guidance, he gave it the requisite authority, emphasis, and visibility to insure that its accomplishment was not left to chance.

Sigel's expedition up the Shenandoah Valley was halted at New Market, where he was defeated by forces commanded by Major General John C. Breckenridge, and including the cadet battalion of the Virginia Military Institute. Sigel withdrew to Strasburg.

Butler's operations against Richmond were stopped short of that city by forces under General Beauregard. Butler's cavalry attacked the Confederate railroads successfully but with little apparent lasting effect.

Meade's Army of the Potomac moved to execute

Grant's strategy in the Wilderness (May 5-7), at Spotsylvania (May 8-21), Hanover Court House/Hanovertown (May 27-31), Cold Harbor (May 31-June 12), and Petersburg (June 15, 1864-April 3, 1865). The rapid and relentless assaults and attempted flanking movements of Meade were anticipated and met with alacrity by Lee until the Army of the Potomac crossed the James River and moved on Petersburg. Casualties within both armies were high, and the overpowering weight of Union resources was finally, after three years of war, being brought to bear without giving General Lee respite. Only a token of the offensive power that had been the glory of the Army of Northern Virginia remained. The honor to expend that power was given to Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early.

The possibilities of Lee's breaking out of the siege at Petersburg were slim to nonexistent as long as Meade's forces were in tact. If a part of the Union force were recalled to the defense of Washington, Lee's chances would improve. Resorting to the strategy that was an underlying factor of Confederate successes in Northern Virginia from the beginning of the war, Lee planted the spark of a threat against Washington with Early in June, 1865. Early moved with two light corps down the Shenandoah Valley and arrived at Frederick, Maryland, on July 9. On that day Early defeated a Union force commanded by Major General Lewis Wallace at the

Monocacy River. On the 11th, Early arrived at Washington, reconnoitered the defenses, decided against an assault, and withdrew to the Shenandoah Valley.

Early's Washington raid drew a reinforced corps from Meade's army, and, subsequently, Major General Philip H. Sheridan's campaign against Early in the Shenandoah Valley used the equivalent of two corps from the Petersburg front. In reprisal for the destruction of private property by Union forces under Major General David Hunter in Virginia, Early demanded a ransom for Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. When it was not paid, the town was burned by one of Early's subordinates. This may have influenced Grant's orders to Hunter:

If the enemy is south of the Potomac, attack and follow him as long as it is safe to do so. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage and stock wanted for your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. Buildings should be protected and not destroyed.⁴²

In August, Grant consolidated the four military departments which were associated with the defenses of Washington and gave Sheridan the command and assets with which to combat Early. The threat which Early had posed was terminated at the Battle of Cedar Creek on October 19. Early's campaign had been a strategy of desperation and delay, for once Lee was in the trenches at Petersburg, the end, which should have been inevitable before, was near.

General Longstreet's command had been recalled from

Eastern Tennessee to the Army of Northern Virginia in April, 1864, to relieve the pressure of added Union forces on the Petersburg-Richmond front. This movement helped enable Sherman to advance into Georgia on May 3 in conformance with the beginning of Meade's campaign in Virginia. Sherman, with an almost two to one numerical advantage, advanced with care. Johnston blocked and withdrew. At Kenesaw Mountain Johnston stood and repulsed Sherman's forces with severe loss, but was again flanked out of his position and forced to withdraw. On July 18, Johnston was relieved because of his failure to stop Sherman's advance. Lieutenant General John B. Hood was given the temporary rank of general and assigned to command the Army of Tennessee. Hood fought Sherman with little success and severe loss in casualties. Hood evacuated Atlanta on September 1 and moved into North Georgia and Alabama. Sherman stopped pursuing Hood and provided Major General George H. Thomas in Nashville with resources to deal with the Army of Tennessee. Moving on Nashville, Hood took severe casualties at the Battle of Franklin on November 30, and on December 15-16 was driven from Nashville. Hood's rationale for undertaking the course of operations which he pursued after the evacuation was based on his belief that the Army of Tennessee was too weak to confront the main force of Sherman's army, the fact that no reinforcements were available, and his conviction that if the army

had stayed in front of Sherman, it would have become continually weaker through desertions. Therefore, Hood took the offensive in the hope of raising the morale of his troops and causing Sherman to divide his forces.⁴³

Opposed by token Confederate opposition, Sherman captured Savannah without a siege on December 21. The Confederacy had been split a second time.

In 1864 west of the Mississippi River General Kirby Smith had repelled Banks' Red River expedition (March-May), and had seen General Price's raid into Missouri distract Union forces from the more active theater in Tennessee (September-November); but as the year closed, Confederate forces in the Trans-Mississippi Department were being depleted rapidly by desertion. The Middle Confederacy was by now almost overrun with Union forces with the exception of Alabama and the fortified city of Mobile. The strategy of "Scott's Anaconda," with the addition of emancipation, and Grant's policy of total war had almost completed their work.

The last calendar year of the war opened with the capture, on January 15, of Fort Fisher, the outpost of Wilmington, which fell one week later. Wilmington was the last of the effective major Confederate ports utilized by the blockade runners. After three years and nine months, the strategic objective for which "Scott's Anaconda" was named was achieved.

On February 3, representatives of the Confederate government met with President Lincoln and his Secretary of State at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to discuss possible terms for peace. No middle ground could be found between Lincoln's insistence upon unconditional restoration of the Union and the Confederate demand for terms between two independent nations. The military situation enabled Lincoln to speak from strength. The Confederates were grasping at straws—obstinately.

At the initiative of the Confederate Congress, General Lee was assigned as General-in-Chief of the Confederate armies on February 6. On February 22, at Lee's request, General Joseph E. Johnston was assigned to the command of operations in South Carolina.

Sherman continued his devastation of Confederate resources by moving from Savannah into South Carolina on February 1. The Confederate leadership was hard pressed to reconstitute the Army of Tennessee in his path before he moved, first to Columbia, South Carolina (February 15); then to Fayetteville, North Carolina (March 12); and to Goldsboro (March 23).⁴⁴

General Lee's last desperate effort to escape ended at Appomattox Court House. Prior to his capitulation he asked the advice of some of his closest subordinates. Brigadier General E. Porter Alexander proposed guerrilla warfare as an option to surrender.⁴⁵ Lee declined, and

on April 9, 1865, the Confederate States of America abandoned seeking the national objective of independence through the application of force. "Scott's Anaconda," or a facsimile thereof, had prevailed.

IN RETROSPECT

The national military strategy that was outlined for the Union by General Scott, as implemented and refined for total war by Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, Farragut and Porter, was the correct strategy. "Scott's Anaconda" was an offensive strategy that attacked the Confederacy's mammoth Achilles heel—its lack of resources. Scott was probably better prepared than anyone in the nation to foresee the problems and consumption of time associated with mobilization on a scale that would be required to conquer the Confederacy, including recruitment, training, organizing, and equipping the armed forces. His plan provided for offensive action to be taken while forces were being built.

Application of adequate emphasis in the implementation of the Union's military strategy appears most lacking in the accomplishment of the implied mission of closing Confederate ports. George A. Bruce points out the fact that there were only nine harbors between Cape Charles, Virginia, and the Mississippi River with railroads running to the interior, making these the high volume commercial

ports within the Confederacy. By May 1, 1862, six of these nine ports had been closed. Charleston was not rendered ineffective until September, 1863, Mobile in August, 1864, and Wilmington in January, 1865. It would appear that if an earlier emphasis had been given to closing ports, then these could have been closed sooner, significantly saving manpower that was being dissipated daily.

Emphasizing the relatively small resources expended in operations against the ports, Bruce states that in the total operations to close the foregoing ports 5,264 Confederate prisoners were taken at a cost of 3,094 Union personnel lost.⁴⁶

Regardless of port closure rate, the Confederate armies had to be fought, and after the trial period of 1861-62, the competent Union commanders for this task had generally come to the top. During the first half of the war Lincoln was shackled with political obligations in officer assignment that receded as the war effort in the North unified, and the weeding-out of incompetents from political and military sources was reflected by improved implementation of the military strategy.

Close behind in importance to the defeat of Confederate armies, sealing of Southern ports, and control of major rivers was the capture of railroad centers. This priority fell into place more readily in the West than in the East, probably more from Confederate sensitivity

to Richmond's increasing dependence on deep-South support as the war progressed and its resultant attention to the defense of the railroad system supporting Lee's army and that city, than from a lack of offensive awareness by the Union strategists.

The case for Lincoln's and Grant's strategy of orientation of the Union Army on Lee's army instead of Richmond is true and well-taken, but susceptible to overstatement. After the loss of Tennessee by the Confederacy that government could not last long without the state of Virginia, and Virginia could not last without Richmond.

Considering the disparity between Confederate and Union resources, it is not likely that the Confederacy could have won the war without a foreign ally. Davis' concern that foreign sympathy would not align itself with an aggressive Confederacy at the beginning of the war was probably exaggerated. Regardless, a defensive military strategy suited the purpose and the resource capabilities of the Confederacy.

Although Confederate resource, financial, and military mismanagement did not lose the war, it was the limitations of resources and not a defensive strategy that caused the Confederacy to fall shorter than its potential to win the war.

The defensive strategy that evolved was limited by Confederate ideology. As General Bragg asserted,

there were some areas within the Confederacy more important than others, and these should have been defended at the possible expense of the areas of lower priority. But what state would have been willing, at the beginning of the war, to risk its own soil for the extended time required to defend more important states or cities or to send strong forces on limited offensive operations?

Within the Confederate military strategy there was an attempted accommodation of perimeter defense, point defense, mobile defense, limited offense, the raid, and guerrilla warfare:

a. The perimeter or cordon defense of the Confederacy attempted particularly in the first year of the war was physically impossible and led to the loss of Middle and most of Western Tennessee.

b. Point defenses became necessary in places such as Forts Henry and Donelson, Vicksburg, and Petersburg. Point defense meant siege and, therefore, inevitable loss to superior Union resources.

c. Resort to point defenses was taken seldom without attempting first a mobile defense which slowed Union advance and made it costly, similar to General Joseph E. Johnston's operations before Atlanta. Johnston held General Sherman to seventy-two miles' advance over a period of one month. General Grant praised Johnston's strategy as the one best for the Confederacy⁴⁷ but neglected to

address its applicability to the defense of Richmond. The shallow depth of the Richmond front, particularly when General Lee inherited it from Johnston, was hardly conducive to such a delaying action no matter how artistically conducted.

d. Generals Stuart, Nathan Bedford Forrest, John H. Morgan, and Early demonstrated a role for the raid in Confederate operations.

e. The effectiveness of guerrilla warfare varied with local leadership and Regular Army direction. Colonel John S. Mosby's operations proved its applicability to the Confederate repertoire.

f. The limited offense also had its place: flank attacks, operations against the Union rear and communications, and hitting the Union weakness paid dividends.⁴⁸ This was the strategy or tactic in which the Confederate forces could take a major initiative. The Confederacy could not hope to wait out the war expecting simply to receive attacks like those made on Fredericksburg and Chickamauga. Lee's often maligned limited offensive operations in Maryland and Pennsylvania and Kirby Smith's and Bragg's operations in Kentucky were within the Confederate resource capabilities and were in consonance with Confederate military strategy objectives.

The criticism by revisionist historians⁴⁹ who have assailed General Lee's offensive-defensive strategy

as an unwarranted disipation of Confederate manpower resources is difficult to refute from the viewpoint of the tactical errors of Lee's frontal assaults at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg, and his acceptance of the battle at Antietam Creek. However, those critics have not offered a more likely strategy for winning than the one used by Lee within his theater of operations.

The defeat of the Confederacy should not be laid in the lap of Jefferson Davis, but he must at least accept the Commander-in-Chief's responsibility for the prolonged use of the cordon defense and for an over-reliance on a military departmental administrative system to dictate military strategy. Davis' selection and retention of inept commanders and his reluctance to delegate authority for military affairs at national level were also of significant deleterious effect in the Confederacy's conduct of the war.

In a war that should not have been, the military strategy of the United States achieved the objectives of its national policy through the application of force. The military strategy of the Confederacy delayed the inevitable.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

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